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Abstract 
Bolivia recently implemented new reforms granting autonomy to departmental, regional, 
municipal, and indigenous and rural governments. What effects might these have on public 
investment patterns, government responsiveness, government fiscal relations, the 
sustainability of public finances, and political accountability? I examine autonomies in light 
of fiscal federalism theory, and evidence on the effects of Bolivia’s 1994 decentralization. By 
submitting new reforms to the dual rigors of theory and evidence, we can try to arrive at 
contingent predictions of its likely effects. These allow us to make recommendations for 
adjustments that may strengthen democracy and give voice to the poor. 
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1. Introduction 
 Decentralization is one of the most widespread and influential policy trends of the 
past generation. In countries as different as Colombia, Egypt, India and the Ukraine, public 
administrations are being decentralized in an attempt to make them more efficient, flexible 
and responsive. And under the guises of subsidiarity, devolution and federalism, reform is 
firmly in the foreground of policy discourse in rich countries too. Indeed one recent study 
(Manor 1999) estimates that between 80% and 100% of the world’s countries have 
experimented with one or another form of decentralization during recent years. 
 One of the most radical and sincere of decentralization reformers is Bolivia, whose 
1994 Popular Participation reforms devolved widespread political powers and resources to 
hundreds of municipal governments that were created throughout the land. This experience 
has been widely studied in the international literature, and cited as an example for reformers 
as far afield as Bangladesh and Nepal. Bolivia is currently implementing a further round of 
reforms that deepen and extend decentralization in significant ways. The recently 
promulgated Framework Law of Autonomies and Decentralization (Government of Bolivia 
2010) is a wide-ranging bill that reforms public administration by granting a degree of 
autonomy to departmental, regional, municipal, and indigenous and rural governments. 
What long-term effects might this have on public investment patterns, government 
responsiveness, government fiscal relations, the sustainability of public finances, and political 
accountability? In Bolivia the new law has been the object of heated political debate, protest, 
and even a cross-country march, with broad claims made both in favour and against it. This 
paper seeks to set aside such rhetoric and instead apply analysis to what is potentially an 
important reform of Bolivia’s governance arrangements. Acknowledging from the outset that 
it is impossible to analyze the effects of a still-new law, this paper instead examines its main 
provisions in light of the insights provided by the international fiscal federalism literature, 
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and extensive evidence on the effects of Bolivia’s 1994 reforms. My hope is that by 
submitting the law to the dual rigors of high-level theory and detailed evidence, we can arrive 
at contingent predictions of its likely effects which, if not precise, are at least reasonable 
baselines. These in turn allow us to make recommendations for amendments and adjustments, 
not so much to the legal text itself as to the more complicated and nuanced question of the 
implementation of reform. 
The deeper aim of this paper is twofold: (1) to bring the new reforms to light for the 
much wider audience of countries currently undertaking decentralization reforms; and (2) to 
inform and enrich the current debate within Bolivia on how autonomies can be implemented 
in ways that strengthen democracy and give voice to the poor. In the interests of analytical 
clarity and empirical tractability, I follow Faguet (2004 & 2009) in defining decentralization 
henceforth as the devolution by central (that is, national) government of specific functions, 
with all of the administrative, political and economic attributes that these entail, to 
democratic local (that is, regional or municipal) governments that are independent of the 
centre within a legally delimited geographic and functional domain. Our second concept, 
autonomy, occurs much less frequently in the literature. Autonomy is defined by the Oxford 
English Dictionary (2009) as “Of a state, institution, etc.: The right of self-government, of 
making its own laws and administering its own affairs.” Dickovick (2005) helpfully signals 
the three most important types of autonomies as legal, political and fiscal. The function of 
decentralization as defined in this study is therefore to modify a country’s legal framework so 
as to increase the political and fiscal autonomy of its subnational (regional or municipal) 
governments. 
The theoretical justification for such reforms is debated at great length in the 
decentralization literature, a debate which has converged to no common position. This study 
has no space for discussion of such complex, contested theoretical matters, and instead refers 
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readers to Treisman (2007) and Faguet (Forthcoming), which provide careful, nuanced 
discussions of the theoretical implications of decentralization. Instead, I limit myself here to 
simply stating what in my opinion are the principal arguments in favor of decentralization 
that theory provides. When implemented correctly and sincerely, the local autonomy that 
decentralization generates should increase citizen voice and participation in public decision-
making, so improving the accountability, and hence responsiveness, of governments to the 
governed. These changes result in a practice of democracy that is deeper and stronger than 
the comparatively centralized government that came before. 
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 surveys the most important empirical results 
on the effects of decentralization found in that literature. Section 3 presents the main 
provisions of the autonomies law, and section 4 does the same for the 1994 decentralization 
reform. Section 5 uses an original database to examine the empirical effects of 
decentralization on the universe of Bolivian municipalities over a 21-year period, attempting 
to trace outcomes back to salient features of the reform. Section 6 returns to the current 
reform, analyzing it in light of this evidence and insights on “international best practice” from 
the fiscal federalism literature. Section 7 concludes. 
2. The Empirical Literature 
The empirical literature on decentralization spans several disciplines and, if we 
include the “gray literature” of official studies and agency reports, runs into literally 
thousands of pieces over the past 30 years. To review this huge body of work within the 
limits of a journal article, some sampling method is required that does not lose the diversity 
of disciplinary and methodological approaches, nor of research findings, that characterize this 
literature. The rough-and-ready approach used here relies on literature surveys conducted at 
different points in time to characterize the development of this literature over four decades. 
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First, consider Faguet and Sánchez’ (2008) review of 24 articles on decentralization 
published in World Development since 1997. This survey is important because the journal in 
question has published the largest number of decentralization papers over the past three 
decades, and is widely considered the top-ranked journal in the field of Development Studies. 
Of 24 articles on decentralization reviewed by the authors, focusing mainly on local 
government and responsiveness, 11 report broadly positive results, and 13 are negative. Blair 
(2000), Fiszbein (1997), de Oliveira (2002), Parry (1997), Petro (2001), Rowland (2001), and 
Shankar and Shah (2003) are most enthusiastic, finding that decentralization improved the 
quality of democratic governance and public sector outputs in a variety of ways. Others such 
as Andersson (2004), Larson (2002), McCarthy (2004) and Nygren (2005) argue that 
decentralization may have positive effects, but the complex, problematic nature of reform 
makes it hard to tell. 
 Amongst skeptics, Bahiigwa, Rigby and Woodhouse (2005), Casson and Obidzinski 
(2002), Ellis, Kutengule and Nyasulu (2003), Ellis and Mdoe (2003), Ellis and Bahiigwa 
(2003), Francis and James (2003), Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003), de Mello (2000), 
Porter (2002), Sundar (2001), Thun (2004), Wiggins, Marfo and Anchirinah (2004), and 
Woodhouse (2003) range from cautious skeptical to strikingly negative assessments of 
decentralization’s effects on the quality of policy-making, corruption and elite capture, the 
quality and distribution of public goods, and key indicators of development such as poverty, 
growth and economic stability. 
 Recent research articles in the Journal of Latin American Studies focusing on 
decentralization’s effects on governance are fewer but more positive. Ward and Rodríguez 
(1999) find that decentralization and renewed federalist reforms in Mexico are leading to the 
emergence of a sort of ‘co-governance’. This is driving a separation of powers and 
administrative modernization in Mexico, which is in turn improving that country’s 
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participation and democratic accountability. And Eaton (2001) examines successive cycles of 
decentralisation and re-centralisation in Argentina, one of the region’s earliest decentralisers. 
He finds that decentralisation is intimately connected with democratisation, and not 
liberalization, or at least not in the direction that much of the literature predicts. In Argentina, 
liberalizing reformers centralized fiscal revenues at the expense of the periphery. 
 Further evidence is provided by broad surveys that, at various points since the 1980s, 
have assessed the state of the field attempting to reach concrete conclusions about 
decentralization’s empirical effects. One of the most influential surveys is Rondinelli, 
Cheema and Nellis (1983), who note that decentralization seldom, if ever, lives up to 
expectations. Most of the developing countries they examine experienced serious 
administrative problems implementing decentralization. 
A decade and a half later, surveys by Manor (1999), Piriou-Sall (1998), and Smoke 
(2001) are somewhat more optimistic, but with caveats about the strength of evidence in 
favor of decentralization. Manor notes that the evidence, though extensive, is still incomplete. 
Smoke finds the evidence mixed and anecdotal, and asks whether there is empirical 
justification for pursuing decentralization at all. More recently, in a review of 56 studies 
published since the late-1990s, Shah, Thompson and Zou (2004) find evidence that 
decentralization has in some cases improved, and in others worsened, service delivery, 
corruption, macroeconomic stability, and growth across a large range of countries. 
Litvack et al. (1998) summarize the literature this way: “It is not much of an 
exaggeration to say that one can prove, or disprove, almost any proposition about 
decentralization by throwing together some set of cases or data” (p.30). Treisman’s (2007) 
more recent review of the literature is bleaker still. He finds results on the effects of 
decentralization mixed at best, and for the most part inconclusive, weak and contradictory. 
“To date,” he says, “there are almost no solidly established, general empirical findings about 
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the consequences of decentralization” (p.250). “Almost nothing that is robust or general has 
emerged” (p.268). The lack of progress over 25 years and hundreds of studies reviewed by 
these authors is striking. 
By contrast with this unfortunate state of affairs, the experience of decentralization in 
Bolivia has produced clear and unambiguous results. The following sections introduce 
Bolivian reforms and then review evidence of their effects from a database that includes the 
universe of Bolivian municipalities. I begin describing the central tenets of the current 
autonomies bill, and then turn to the older, well established Law of Popular Participation 
(LPP). Taking these reforms in reverse order allows us to use 16 years of evidence on the 
effects of decentralization at the municipal level to predict likely outcomes of extending these 
political and administrative autonomies to departmental, regional, and indigenous and rural 
governments – in effect what the autonomies bill proposes. 
3. The Law of Autonomies and Decentralization  
Continuing with its recent trend of expanding the scope of subnational government, 
Bolivia is currently implementing a new law that grants regional and indigenous autonomies 
at the subnational level (Government of Bolivia 2010). The law regulates the territorial 
organization of the state and integrates the new legal concept of autonomies into the pre-
existing regime of municipal and departmental decentralization, with some adjustments to 
both of the latter levels. What exactly is this “autonomy”? The law states that autonomy is 
exercised when citizens freely elect subnational political authorities who have the following 
powers: 
• create, administer and collect taxes 
• enact local resolutions and regulations 
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• design and implement local policies, plans and programs in the judicial, 
administrative, technical, economic, financial, cultural and social fields, and 
• use coercive powers to compel respect for the legal norms and decisions that they 
implement. (Article 7)  
Autonomous governments are obligated to give account to their constituent citizens and 
organizations for their actions and decisions. And the taxes and policies they enact may not 
restrict the free movement of individuals, goods and property, services or other economic 
activities. 
Four levels of autonomy are defined: Departmental, Regional, Municipal, and 
Indigenous and Rural. While the first three represent a clear hierarchical descent in territorial 
extent and level of government, the fourth is a sort of autonomy that is qualitatively different 
in terms of social makeup and hence political characteristics, and which can be exercised at 
different hierarchical levels. I examine all four types of autonomy in turn below. 
In conjunction with the new Constitution, the law also defines the procedures required 
for different territorial units to attain autonomous status. These range from the 
straightforward in the case of departments – mainly a referendum, to complicated 
arrangements in the case of regions, where municipal councilors must form a provisional 
(regional) assembly to write their normative statutes, submit them to the Constitutional 
Tribunal for approval, and then both statutes and the question of autonomy be approved by 
electoral majorities in each territorial unit that makes up the region. Where territorial units 
have not chosen to become autonomous, the previous decentralized administration of the 
state (prefectures, regions and municipalities, all modestly reformed) will remain in force. 
The law thus establishes two distinct political and administrative systems to operate in 
parallel across Bolivia, with territorial units in effect choosing between them: the 
decentralization regime, and that of departmental, regional and local autonomies. Because 
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Bolivian decentralization has already been treated above and new reforms are modest, I 
henceforth focus on the new autonomies and their likely effects on government efficiency 
and responsiveness, the sustainability of public finances, and political mobilization and 
stability. 
Let us first consider what the various autonomies are. Autonomous Departmental 
Governments (Articles 15-17) consist of a legislative and executive branches. The 
departmental assembly has deliberative, legislative and investigative powers, and is elected 
via a combination of universal suffrage and the traditional customs of indigenous and rural 
communities. The executive is led by an elected governor. Departmental revenues include 
statutory transfers, royalties and natural resource exploitation rights, income from the sale of 
property and services, legacies and other donations, departmental taxes as defined in the 
Constitution, and other departmental charges and fees as defined in the Constitution (Article 
127). 
 Autonomous Regional Governments (Articles 18-22) occur at the sub-departmental 
level, when municipalities and/or provinces within a department whose population or area 
sums to at least ten percent of the departmental total join to form a contiguous region. 
Regional governments consist of a regional assembly with deliberative, normative, 
administrative and investigative powers, elected via a combination of universal suffrage 
(itself a combination of first-past-the-post and proportional representation constituencies), 
and the traditional customs of indigenous and rural communities; and also an executive 
branch led by an elected maximum authority. Regional revenues include a share of 
departmental royalties and natural resource exploitation rights, charges and fees as defined in 
the Constitution, income from the sale of property and services, and legacies and other 
donations (Article 130). 
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 Municipalities with at least 10,000 inhabitants (or 5,000 in the case of border towns) 
can transform themselves into Autonomous Municipalities (Articles 23-27), whose 
governments consist of a municipal council, with deliberative, legislative and investigative 
powers, and an executive led by an elected mayor. Like departmental assemblymen, 
councilors are elected via a combination of universal suffrage and the traditional customs of 
indigenous and rural communities. The law explicitly provides for deputy mayoralties and 
sub-municipal districts in order to further deconcentrate local management, planning, service 
delivery and promote greater participation. Municipal revenues include municipal taxes as 
defined in the Constitution, municipal charges, licenses and fees as defined in the 
Constitution, a share of departmental royalties and natural resource exploitation rights, 
income from the sale of property and services, and legacies and other donations (Article 128). 
 And lastly, Indigenous and Rural Autonomies (Articles 28-43) are for Bolivia’s 
indigenous and rural  
nations and peoples who share a cultural identity, language, historical traditions, institutions, 
territory and world view, whose existence pre-dates the colony, but to include also the Afro-
Bolivian people, and whose territory is presently inhabited by such nations and peoples. (Article 
30(1)) 
This form of autonomy allows such communities to apply their own principles and 
institutional forms to the question of self-government, defense of their cultures, and 
organization of their economies. The law stipulates that all such autonomous authorities must 
respect the rights and guarantees laid out in the Constitution, including particularly the 
security of private property. Indigenous and rural autonomy can be exercised at the territorial, 
municipal, or regional level, but not at the departmental level. The reason for this is 
presumably that none of Bolivia’s nine departments complies with the law’s criteria of 
indigenous majority and homogeneity – i.e. departments are too multi-ethnically diverse for 
this form of autonomy to apply. 
   
 10 
 The law lays out specific requirements for each hierarchical level to attain this form of 
autonomy. For example, highland territories must have at least 10,000 inhabitants, but 
lowland territories need only have 3,000 inhabitants; and the State Autonomies and 
Decentralization Service (newly created by this law) must certify that an adequate 
institutional capacity exists in the territory. The law goes into greater detail on requirements 
and processes for each hierarchical level, including specific measures for the re-drawing of 
municipal borders where particular autonomy petitions may make this necessary. For the sake 
of brevity I refer readers to the text of the law and omit further detail here. 
 What do indigenous and rural autonomous governments look like? In the spirit of 
recognizing pre-existing social norms, customs and institutions amongst Bolivia’s indigenous 
peoples, the law leaves this question notably open (Articles 36-38). Such governments, it 
says, will consist of collegiate institutions such as assemblies, councils, districts, captaincies, 
and others; named executive authorities such as executive secretaries, apumallkus, 
mamatajllas, captains, chiefs, and others; and also other principle governing bodies such as 
councils, confederations, coordinating committees, and others. The law requires autonomous 
communities to name their authorities, define their attributes and functions, determine 
explicit methods for periodic renewal, and determine sanctions for breach or non-compliance. 
More specific organization features are left to autonomous communities’ discretion. Their 
revenues include local charges, licenses and fees as defined in the Constitution, a share of 
departmental royalties and natural resource exploitation rights, income from the sale of 
property and services, and legacies and other donations (Article 129). 
The specific powers and attributes of the various autonomous governments are left 
undefined by the law. These are determined on an individual basis, after specific autonomy 
petitions have succeeded and normative statutes have been approved, as stipulated by the law. 
The law establishes a procedure for the transfer of individual powers to each of the four 
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levels of autonomous governments. This makes it had to generalize at this stage what their 
specific powers and attributes may be. In the absence of clear guidelines, one reasonable 
assumption is that each level of autonomous government will largely inherit the powers and 
attributes of the decentralized administration that preceded it. Hence autonomous 
departments will largely inherit the powers of prefectures, autonomous municipalities of 
decentralized municipalities, and both autonomous regions and indigenous and rural 
governments will inherit the powers of the previously independent units that make them up. 
This implies that the political foundations, legitimacy and accountability of each level of 
government would be changed far more than its specific attributes and powers, an approach 
that presumably responds to the underlying purpose of the law. 
The transfer of new authorities and functions to autonomous governments are 
accompanied by a corresponding transfer of resources from higher levels of government. The 
magnitude of these transfers are calculated based on initial cost calculations, adjusted for 
local fiscal effort, inflation, and (national) economic growth. Autonomous governments could 
also finance investments (but not expenditures) through public debt. The law includes a “no 
bail-out” clause stating that debt contracted by autonomous and decentralized entities is the 
strict responsibility of the borrowing entity, and not of the national government nor 
subnational governments. The Comptroller General oversees the fiscal accounts of 
autonomous and decentralized governments, who are additionally and more generally 
accountable for their broader administrative and fiscal affairs to Congress. 
But it is the people, the law clearly states, who principally enforce accountability on 
autonomous and decentralized governments, using the political process to control their 
actions and audit their accounts. This occurs not only through elections and lobbying, but also 
through civic organizations exercising “social control” of the quality of public services 
offered by Bolivia’s subnational governments (Articles 163-166). 
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4. The 1994 Decentralization Program 
On the eve of revolution, Bolivia was a poor, backward country with extreme levels 
of inequality. The nationalist revolution of 1952, which expropriated the “commanding 
heights” of the economy, land and mines, launched Bolivia on the road to one of the most 
centralized state structures in the region. The government embarked upon a state-led 
modernization strategy in which public corporations and regional governments initiated a 
concerted drive to break down provincial fiefdoms, transform existing social relations, and 
create a modern, industrial, more egalitarian society (Dunkerley 1984). To this end the 
President directly appointed Prefects, who in turn designated entire regional governments and 
associated dependencies, forming a national chain of cascading authority emanating from the 
capital.  
 Successive governments through the 1950s promoted the unionization of miners, 
laborers, peasants, public servants and professionals into a hierarchical “peak association”, 
whose representatives negotiated national policies directly with their similars from the private 
sector and government (Dunkerley 1984, 43). Together these three planned the exploitation 
of Bolivia’s natural resources, the development of new industries, and sectoral and regional 
policy in a bid to orchestrate a rapid development process from the heights of La Paz. With 
political power so little dispersed, there was little point in establishing the legal and political 
instruments of local governance. As a result beyond the nine regional capitals (including La 
Paz) and an additional 25-30 cities, local government existed in Bolivia at best in name, as an 
honorary and ceremonial institution devoid of administrative capability and starved for funds. 
And in most of the country it did not exist at all. 
 Although the 1994 reform surprised the nation, the concept of decentralization was 
not at all new. For over three decades a decentralization debate focused on Bolivia’s nine 
departments ebbed and flowed politically – at times taking central stage, other times forgotten 
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entirely. The issue became enmeshed in the country’s centrifugal tensions, as regional elites 
in Tarija and Santa Cruz consciously manipulated the threat of secession to Argentina and 
Brazil – with which each is economically more integrated than the altiplano – to extract 
resources from La Paz. Bolivia’s particular paradox of a weak but highly centralized state, 
and an ethnically diverse population with a weak national identity, meant that such threats 
were taken seriously by political elites, who blocked all moves to devolve power or authority 
to the departments. 
The law was first made public in January of 1994, was promulgated by Congress in 
April, and implemented beginning July 1st. The scale of the changes in political power and 
resource flows that it catalyzed were huge. At the law’s core are four points (Secretaría 
Nacional de Participación Popular, 1994): 
1. Resource Allocation. Funds devolved from the centre to municipalities doubled to 20 
per cent of all national tax revenue. Crucially, allocation amongst municipalities 
switched from unsystematic, highly political criteria to a strict per capita basis. 
2. Responsibility for Public Services. Ownership of local infrastructure in education, 
health, irrigation, roads, sports and culture, and water & sanitation was given to 
municipalities, along with a responsibility to manage and maintain these facilities and 
invest in new ones. Staffing issues, including responsibility for salaries, remained 
central attributes. 
3. Oversight Committees (OCs; Comités de Vigilancia) were established to provide a 
parallel channel of representation in the policy-making process. Composed of 
representatives from grass-roots groups, OCs propose projects and oversee municipal 
activities. They can have disbursements of central transfers suspended if they find 
funds are being misused or stolen, which quickly paralyzes most local governments. 
This gives them real power. 
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4. Municipalization. The borders of existing municipalities were expanded to include 
suburbs and rural catchment areas, and 198 new municipalities (out of some 311 in 
all, since increased to 327) were created. 
 These measures catalyzed an immense change in local affairs. Before reform, local 
government did not exist throughout most of Bolivia. The state was present at most in the 
form of a military garrison, schoolhouse or – less frequently – a health clinic, each reporting 
to its respective ministry. After reform, local governments and local politics sprouted 
throughout the land. 
 Before commencing the analysis, it is useful to review quickly the institutional 
framework of local government in Bolivia. The Bolivian municipal code stipulates that 
municipal councilmen be elected from party lists in single-constituency elections. The 
council then elects the mayor indirectly from amongst those of them who garnered the most 
votes. The third institution of local government is the oversight committee (OC), in effect a 
non-electoral form of representation that operates in parallel to municipal councils and 
mayors. These are composed of the representatives of grass-root organizations within each 
municipality. Municipalities are divided into four or more regions depending on size and 
population. Each region contains a number of grass-roots organizations (GROs); these occur 
spontaneously and naturally throughout Bolivia. Examples of such GROs include 
neighborhood councils in urban areas, pre-Columbian ayllus and mallkus for community self-
government on the altiplano and in the Chaco region, and tribal structures in Bolivia’s eastern 
lowlands, although there are many more. GROs have a wide variety of traditions and 
conventions of self-organization and leader selection which the Bolivian municipal code 
recognizes as legitimate, without intervention. In this way the traditional practices of 
community self-government, and their attendant social legitimacy, are explicitly incorporated 
into the Bolivian municipal governance system. 
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GRO leaders within each of a municipality’s constituent regions nominate a 
representative to the OC, using whatever system they can agree on. OC members elect from 
amongst themselves a president, whose legal status is comparable to the mayor’s. The OC’s 
power lies in its natural moral authority, as well as the ability to suspend disbursements from 
central to local government if it judges that funds are being misused. Oversight committees 
thus comprise a parallel, corporatist form of social representation similar to an upper house of 
parliament, enforcing accountability on the mayor and municipal council.3 
5. The Effects of Decentralization in Bolivia 
Assessing the effects of decentralization in a country where two thirds of 
municipalities did not exist prior to reform presents a number of methodological challenges. 
Existing data prior to 1994 is organized by individual investment project, and not according 
to the municipalities defined subsequently. Hence a colleague and I were obliged to go 
through detailed investment records project-by-project to allocate central government 
investments to Bolivia’s post-reform municipalities. 
Decentralization led to large changes in resource flows across Bolivia. Figure 1 shows 
that before reform, 308 municipalities shared a mere 14 percent of all centrally devolved 
funds between them, while the three main cities received 86 percent. After decentralization 
the shares reversed to 73 percent and 27 percent respectively. The per capita criterion resulted 
in a massive shift of resources away from the richest urban centers. Many smaller, poorer 
rural districts saw resource increases in the tens of thousands of percent. 
                                                 
3 I am indebted to Teddy Brett for this apt analogy. 
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Figure 1: Changing Resource Flows After Decentralization 
 
Central-to-Local 
 
% of 
National 
 
Revenue Sharing (Bs'000) 
 
Total 
City 1993 1995 % Change 
 
1993 1995 
La Paz 114,292 61,976 -46%   51% 10% 
Santa Cruz 51,278 63,076 23% 
 
23% 10% 
Cochabamba 25,856 38,442 49% 
 
12% 6% 
3 Cities Sub-total 191,427 163,494 -15% 
 
86% 27% 
Rest of Bolivia 32,099 444,786 1286%   14% 73% 
Total 223,525 608,280 172% 
 
100% 100% 
N.B. Average exchange rate: US$1=Bs.5 
   Source: National Secretariat of Public Investment and External Finance. 
 A more important change was to the allocation of investment funds across sectors. 
Figure 2 compares the sum of local plus national government investments during the last 
three years before reform (1991-93) vs. the first three years after reform (1994-96). The 
differences are dramatic. Total education investment surged by 547 percent after 
decentralization; total investment in water & sanitation increased 133 percent, water 
management rose 77 percent, and health rose 43 percent. By contrast, investments in 
communication and industry & tourism fell by almost 60 percent each, with smaller but still 
significant falls in energy and hydrocarbons of around 20 percent each. In sum, 
decentralization seems to have reoriented public investment away from economic 
infrastructure, towards primary services and human capital. Figure 3, which groups the 
previous sectors by type, confirms this trend. 
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Figure 2: Changes in the Distribution of Public Investment by Sector 
Change in National (Central + Local) 
Public Investment, 1991-93 vs. 1994-96 
  Sector Change (%)   
  Education 547%   
  Water & Sanitation 133%   
  Water Management 77%   
  Transport 44%   
  Health 43%   
  Mining & Metallurgy 34%   
  Multisectoral 11%   
  Hydrocarbons -18%   
  Energy -23%   
  Urban Development -27%   
  Agriculture -34%   
  Industry & Tourism -57%   
  Communication -59%   
  TOTAL 16%   
Source: National Secretariat of Public Investment and External Finance; my calculations. 
Figure 3: Changes in the Distribution of Public Investment by Type 
 
 Did decentralization change the allocation of public resources across space? Figures 
4-6 show investment per capita across Bolivia, where each municipality is represented by a 
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‘dot’. The charts plots per capita investments summed over all sectors on the vertical axis, 
and a municipal identifier along the horizontal axis. Municipalities are ordered by increasing 
investment. These charts use a longer time span, comparing investments over the last seven 
years before decentralization (1987-1993 inclusive) to investments under local government 
during the first 14 years after.4 Before examining the charts, consider what would extreme 
patterns of investment look like? The most unequal investment pattern across space possible 
would be represented by a lone dot at a very high level, and all the other dots on the 
horizontal axis at zero. The most equal investment pattern possible would find all the dots 
forming a horizontal line across the chart at some intermediate level. What do the charts 
actually show? 
                                                 
4 Ideally we would compare equal 14 year periods. But data from before 1987 are incomplete and of extremely low 
quality due to the hyperinflation Bolivia suffered during 1984 and 1985. 
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Figure 4: Pre-Reform Investment by Central Government 
 
Figure 5: Pre-Reform Investment by Central Government  
(Highest 6 observations dropped) 
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Figure 6: Post-Reform Investment by Local Governments 
 
 Under central government the spatial pattern of investment was not quite as unequal 
as it is technically possible to be, but it was close. Figure 4 show one lucky municipality 
receiving more than Bs 75,000 per capita during this period, another more than Bs 40,000 per 
capita, and a third more than Bs 20,000 per capita, all immense sums in the Bolivian context. 
But these very high observations compress the vertical axis, obscuring variation at lower 
levels. Hence figure 5 expands the vertical axis by dropping the highest 6 observations in 
order to focus on the vast majority of municipalities receiving less than Bs 10,000 per capita. 
While we do indeed see more dots between Bs.1-4,000 per capita, notice the thick horizontal 
line at zero investment. If we count these dots, we see that central government invested Bs 
0.0 per capita in 40 percent of Bolivian municipalities. Increasing the threshold to Bs 0.1 per 
capita during this period captures 59 percent of municipalities. During the seven years 
preceding reform, a central government that held all national power and resources in its hands 
chose to invest nothing at all in 40 percent of Bolivian municipalities, and less than one-tenth 
of a boliviano per capita in a further 19 percent of municipalities, spread over seven years. 
This lowest 59 percent of municipalities are disproportionately Bolivia’s small, poor, rural 
districts. 
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 Compare with local government investments in figure 6. No municipality lies on the 
horizontal axis, at zero investment, and more than 83 percent occupy a band between Bs 1-
4,000 per capita. Average investment is Bs 1,025 per capita, and thus the band contains the 
mean.5 While this is not the equal extreme described above, it is far closer than the pattern 
under central government. These simple indicators imply that decentralized government 
distributed public investment much more evenly then centralized government had before. 
Equality in per-capita terms is, of course, largely the result of the design of the reform, as 
noted above. The ex-post result is thus not as surprising as the ex-ante distribution, in which 
the center – with a much larger budget and free rein to invest as it chose, consistently opted to 
lavish resources on a few districts and ignore the rest. 
 Did these changes in the allocation of resources across sectors and space lead to 
deeper changes in the quality of public investment? Unfortunately the data required to 
address this question directly are not available for Bolivia (nor indeed for most countries). 
But we can investigate a related question: Did decentralization make government more or 
less responsive to local need? As noted above, improved responsiveness to local citizens is 
one of the central – and most disputed – arguments in favour of decentralization, and hence 
any evidence in this respect is of particular interest. 
 Figure 7 shows scatter plots of central government investment (left-hand side graphs) 
vs. local government investment (right-hand side graphs) in health, agriculture, and 
education. The graphs plot central government investment during the last seven years before 
decentralization vs. local government investment during the first fourteen years after 
                                                 
5 Total invested sums are lower under decentralization because they exclude continuing national government 
programmes such as national defense. 
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decentralization, against objective indicators of real local need in each municipality.6 Each 
graph includes a regression line summarizing the overall relationship. 
 The first comparison shows how centralized health investment varied with the 
percentage of households using private healthcare. This variable is an indicator of local need 
for health investment in that it counts the proportion of households that require healthcare but 
lack access to public health services, and hence must pay for private care. In a small minority 
of Bolivian municipalities, use of private healthcare might also signal social class or status. 
But extensive fieldwork plus professional knowledge of the sector indicates that this would 
be true in only the wealthiest, most sophisticated cities, accounting for perhaps five percent of 
the total. In the vast majority of municipalities, Bolivians resort to private care only when 
they have to. High usage implies an unmet need for public health services, and hence need 
increases with private provision. 
 Under central government, only ten percent of municipalities received any investment 
in health during the seven years before reform. The regression line is horizontal, implying 
that central investment shows no relation to private healthcare, and hence no responsiveness 
to need. This is not what we would expect if central government were investing in areas of 
greatest need. After decentralization, by contrast, the regression line slopes sharply upwards, 
implying that local governments invested progressively in health where need was higher. The 
share of municipalities investing also rises dramatically – to 85 percent immediately after 
decentralization, rising further to 100 percent by the end of the period. 
                                                 
6 I would have preferred to present equal 14-year periods before and after, but reliable data before 1987 are not 
available due to the hyperinflation Bolivia suffered in 1984-85. Nonetheless, the decentralized investment trends 
described here are repeated for different subsets of the post-reform period, of different lengths: e.g. 1994-96, 1994-
2002, 1997-2002, 2003-2007, etc. Hence I am confident that my results are not sensitive to periodization. 
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In agriculture the pattern is even more dramatic. Central agricultural investment fell 
as the malnutrition rate rose, meaning central government chose to concentrate resources 
where the need for greater agricultural productivity was lower, and starve those areas where 
need was higher. And it invested anything at all in only 24 percent of all municipalities over 
seven years. This is the opposite of what we would expect if central government were 
investing in areas of greatest need. After decentralization, by contrast, local governments 
invested progressively more where need was higher. And they did so in many more 
municipalities – 67 percent immediately following reform, rising to 100 percent by the end of 
the period.  
This pattern repeats in education. Central investment fell as the illiteracy rate rose, 
meaning central government chose to concentrate education resources where literacy was 
higher. After decentralization, by contrast, local governments invested progressively more 
where illiteracy was higher, as we would expect if municipalities are responsive to local 
needs. Before reform central government invested in only 15 percent of all municipalities, 
while the other 85 percent received nothing. After reform this rate rises immediately to 97 
percent of municipalities, and quickly thereafter to 100 percent, where it remains. All of these 
regression lines are statistically significant at the 5 per cent level or better. 
Figure 7: Public Investment vs. Local Need 
 Central Gov’t Investment, by Municipality Local Gov’t Investment, by Municipality 
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These graphs imply that decentralization increased government responsiveness to real 
local needs. After 1994, investments in health, agriculture, and education were higher where 
more households lacked access to public healthcare, malnutrition rates were higher, and more 
people were illiterate. That is to say, although median investment in these sectors increased 
throughout Bolivia after decentralization, the increases were even higher in those districts 
where the objective need for such services was greatest. These changes were driven by the 
actions of Bolivia’s 250 smallest, poorest, mostly rural municipalities investing newly 
devolved public funds in their highest-priority projects.  
Thus we see that decentralization in Bolivia shifted public investment from physical 
and economic infrastructure into primary services and human capital formation. Resources 
were redirected from wealthier cities to smaller, poorer, more rural districts. Decentralization 
also reallocated resources much more equally across space. Lastly and most impressively, 
decentralization made public investment significantly more responsive to communities’ real 
local needs than centralized investment had been before. This contradicts common claims 
   
 25 
that local government is too ignorant, corrupt, or prone to capture by local interests to 
improve upon the actions of central government. Bolivia’s local governments did just that. 
This is a significant and impressive story of a successful Bolivian reform. In light of 
this precedent, what effects are current proposals to further decentralize Bolivian government 
via regional and local autonomies likely to have? Although it is by definition impossible to 
analyze the future, especially when the future will in large part be defined by a major reform 
law only recently promulgated, the details of which are still being worked out, the Law of 
Autonomies and Decentralization is sufficiently developed as to allow conditional predictions 
on its likely impacts. I turn to this analysis in the section that follows. 
6. Predicting the Effects of Subnational Autonomies 
Although it is impossible to predict the real effects of the Law of Autonomies and 
Decentralization, it is possible to assess the law’s main stipulations laid out above in light of 
both the theory of fiscal federalism and the Bolivian experience with decentralization. The 
principal effect of the law is to grant political autonomy to both existing and newly created 
levels/instances of government. The law thus changes not only the number and levels of 
subnational governments in Bolivia, but also the political basis by which they are constituted, 
with effects on the legitimacy they enjoy in citizens’ eyes. Its effect is to extend the political 
autonomy that existed at the municipal level in all but name to regional, departmental, and 
indigenous and rural governments, whose leaders will henceforth also be elected, and where 
indigenous groups’ autochthonous forms of organization and representation will be formally 
incorporated into the governing framework, as described above. 
Pubic Investment Patterns and the Responsiveness of Government 
The theory of fiscal federalism develops a number of principals by which the 
relationships amongst different levels of government should be organized. The first of these 
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is the encompassing principle. This says that government responsibilities should be assigned 
across different levels of government such that the costs and benefits of service provision are 
encompassed by the unit of government that provides it. In other words, externalities should 
to the extent possible be internalized within governing units and not borne by other units. 
The most famous example of this principle is the Oates decentralization theorem, 
which holds that local governments should be responsible for all spending that does not 
inflict externalities on other jurisdictions (e.g. fire service, trash collection). Where such 
externalities do arise, respective spending and services should be provided at higher levels of 
government (e.g. regional, departmental, national). 
In reality, different public services have different spatial/geographic properties. But it 
is expensive and administratively unwieldy to establish a distinct level of government for 
each type of public service. Hence most public services are provided by levels of government 
that operate as multipurpose service providers. In other words, the allocation of specific 
services to government levels represents a compromise between the economic and spatial 
demands of the service itself, and the existing fiscal and political hierarchy. Thus the actual 
political jurisdictions of any country will never adequately encompass all the relevant 
externalities, and there will always be a need for intergovernmental cooperation. 
What are the effects of Bolivia’s autonomies likely to be? Applying the encompassing 
principle in densely populated countries, such as India, is complicated due to the rich 
potential for multiple spillovers amongst contiguous districts and villages. Doing so in a 
relatively large (as large as France and Spain combined) but sparsely populated country like 
Bolivia is far easier, as communities are far more isolated and the risk of externalities lower. 
The Oates decentralization theorem is similarly easier to apply. Intergovernmental 
cooperation, while still necessary, will not carry the stresses and weight that it does in more 
densely populated countries where spillovers abound. 
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Will public goods and services be assigned to the right hierarchical level under the 
new regime? This question cannot be answered, as the law explicitly fails to assign services 
to autonomous governments, specifying instead procedures by which specific functions and 
responsibilities can be transferred to them. But as stated above, the deeper logic of the law is 
that autonomous governments will replace decentralized ones, and hence largely inherit their 
functions from the latter. The main characteristics of these autonomies mirror key elements 
found in the 1994 Law of Popular Participation. What do 16 years of accumulated evidence 
and experience with the LPP predict? 
The broad success of decentralization in Bolivia implies that public functions are well 
allocated across the new regime. If responsibility for providing specific goods and services 
had been mis-allocated across levels of government, it is unlikely that the striking changes in 
resource use described above would have occurred. Furthermore, the extension of similar 
institutional forms to the departmental, regional, and indigenous and rural levels can be 
expected, in the aggregate, to further shift public resources towards social services and 
human capital formation, and make investment yet more responsive to real local needs. 
Taxes, Transfers and Fiscal Relations 
In the analysis of fiscal federalism, efficiency considerations imply that taxes should 
be levied on goods and services that are inelastically demanded. But such decisions have 
distributional impacts on society that must also be considered. For example, goods with 
inelastic demand are often necessities (food, shelter), and demand is often most inelastic 
amongst poorer segments of the population. Both sides of this trade-off should be weighed 
when taking decisions about tax incidence. Mobility presents an additional complicating 
factor. The fiscal federalism literature shows that local governments tend to charge 
inefficiently high taxes on immobile goods, services, and factors of production (e.g. 
property), and inefficiently low taxes on mobile goods, services, or factors of production (e.g. 
   
 28 
labor). This provides a presumption that most taxation should be carried out by higher-level 
governments, with taxes on property and other immobiles the preserve of local governments. 
On the other hand, decentralizing taxation offers the possibility of greater 
accountability in the revenue generation activities of the state, much as appears to have 
occurred in Bolivia with regards to public investment. Such an effect would countervail 
inefficiencies related to elasticities and asset mobility. Hence we are faced with another trade-
off in intergovernmental fiscal relations. Based on the text of the law and Bolivia’s recent 
fiscal trends, the new regime would seem to steer a reasonable course amongst these trade-
offs. Autonomous governments’ revenues come mainly from central government transfers, 
royalties, and user fees, with (if recent experience is any guide) a low proportion coming 
from taxes on business activity and other mobile sources. Hence in broad terms the new 
regime appears to be both reasonable and stable. 
Intergovernmental Transfers 
Intergovernmental transfers are an important element of any decentralized fiscal 
system. This is especially true of Bolivia, where transfers will play a large role in financing 
autonomous subnational governments. What principles should guide their design? Consider, 
first, the two types of imbalances that affect most fiscal systems to at least some degree. 
The first is vertical imbalances. Because taxation tends to be centralized and 
expenditure decentralized in a federal system, vertical imbalances ensue. Hence the system 
relies on downward resource transfers in order to function. But such systems effectively 
involve central government in local government affairs, including in issues defined as 
primarily local. The center is implicated in the success or failure of local service provision, 
both administratively and politically, by providing a convenient scapegoat for public 
dissatisfaction with local politicians’ performance. This creates an implicit central obligation 
to bail out subnational governments that get into fiscal difficulties (Rodden, Eskeland and 
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Litvack 2003, Rodden 2006). Even when there is no legal obligation on central government, 
local politicians have every incentive to shift blame to the center for contributing to the initial 
problem and for failing to resolve it. This can generate significant pressures for bail outs that 
central governments often find hard to resist, leading to fiscal imbalances that can ultimately 
threaten macroeconomic stability (e.g. Argentina 2000). 
The second is horizontal imbalances. Some districts are richer than others. Equality, 
poverty reduction goals, and spillovers can lead to redistribution amongst districts, as the 
center uses its taxing and transfer powers to redistribute resources from better off to more 
deprived districts. Done well, such equalization can help develop backwards regions and 
contribute to national unity. Done clumsily, such programs can stoke resentment in the richer 
regions, increasing centrifugal pressures for further autonomy and – at the limit – outright 
secession and national fragmentation. 
 The fiscal federalism literature holds that an effective transfer system should satisfy 
four criteria: 
i. Revenue Adequacy – Transfers should ensure that subnational governments have 
sufficient resources to fulfill their obligations and responsibilities. 
ii. Local tax effort and expenditure control – The transfer system should not undermine 
subnational authorities’ incentives to collect taxes, nor encourage profligacy, deficits 
nor indebtedness. 
iii. Equity – Transfers should rise with local needs and fall with local fiscal capacity. 
iv. Transparency and stability – Transfer formulas should be announced in advance, 
allowing each locality to forecast total revenues in order to prepare its budget. The 
formula should be stable over time to permit long-term local planning. 
How does the new regime look with respect to intergovernmental transfers? The 
combination of large natural resource royalties and low tax capacity implies that large 
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vertical imbalances will continue to be a feature of the Bolivian fiscal system. The autonomy 
law is unlikely to lessen vertical imbalances, and may well exacerbate them. But curiously, 
recent experience gives us little reason to fear the threat of bail outs. Whether the poverty of 
the central state made no-bail-out pledges by the center credible (when compared to 
neighbors like Argentina and Brazil), or deeper historical trends made them unlikely, the fact 
is that over the past few decades bail outs are prominent by their absence in Bolivia. 
The question of horizontal imbalances is considerably more fraught. Central 
redistribution from faster-growing, resource-rich areas to poorer areas is one of the most 
potent rallying cries of regionalist opposition to the current government, and a demand with 
strong historical echoes in Bolivia. At the limit, it is possible that horizontal imbalances and 
the center’s attempts to correct them could deepen political tensions, including demands for 
secession. The extent to which the autonomy regime is likely to improve or worsen horizontal 
imbalances cannot be inferred from the text of the law as it depends crucially on central 
allocation criteria yet to be set by central government. And evidence from Popular 
Participation is mixed. At the outset of the latter, in 1994, reform had the clear effect of 
distributing resources far more equally across space. But subsequent changes to the regime, 
especially the advent of large hydrocarbons-related royalties in recent years, have made the 
distribution of resources across municipalities far less equal. Now, a few sparsely populated 
municipalities in resource-rich areas receive resources that, in per-capita terms, are a huge 
multiple of what the average municipality receives. In other words, the principle that a 
significant share of the royalties generated by resource exploitation should remain locally is 
overturning the principle of equity described above. If the advent of subnational autonomies 
deepens this trend and hydrocarbon royalties return to recent highs, then we can expect 
horizontal inequalities to revert to levels not seen since the days of pure central government 
before 1994. This study strongly recommends modifying these resource flows such that per 
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capita transfers are only modestly higher – in the range of 20-40% – in resource-rich areas 
compared to the average municipality, and redirecting excess funds on the basis of poverty 
indicators. 
Where revenue adequacy is concerned, the new law appears to be on much firmer 
footing. Again, precise levels of transfers cannot be predicted from the law’s text. But the 
precedent set over the past 16 years is that municipalities benefitted from increasing levels of 
transfers which, explicitly or implicitly, recognized ever more fully the financial implications 
of the range of services and public goods that they were meant to provide. If these trends 
continue under the new dispensation, then the most reasonable prediction is that revenues will 
be adequate to fund most autonomous governments’ obligations. 
Regarding local tax effort, the law does well to clearly delineate sources of revenue 
for each new level of autonomous government. Simply doing so creates incentives for 
ambitious politicians to tap these sources of revenue and claim credit for expenditure. Where 
the incidence of expenditures greatly exceeds that of taxes – which will often be the case in a 
country like Bolivia – this constitutes a vote-wining strategy for elected politicians. But this 
simple sort of incentive can be overwhelmed by central transfers rules and the administration 
of central-subnational fiscal relations. Sadly, the latter has been the case in Bolivia in recent 
years. The simple incentive, albeit at lower power than that created by the law, led to 
increasing municipal tax efforts in the first years of Popular Participation. But local tax 
efforts have more recently been in decline or even outright collapse as hydrocarbon royalties 
swamped the taxes that many municipalities could raise from their rural economies, leading 
scores to give up on local tax collection. 
This reversion of a positive trend is a small tragedy for Bolivia as it makes local 
governments ever more dependent on the largesse of the center, reducing their real 
independence, divorces local policymakers from the local economy, and makes local budgets 
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and service provision ever more the object of political maneuvering and competition at the 
national level. In a real sense, such developments undermine the autonomy that the reform 
seeks to establish. This study thus strongly recommends that the national government 
undertake vigorous efforts to reduce local dependency by returning to an incentive system 
that promotes local tax collection. This could easily be done by making central transfers 
dependent on local tax efforts, with clear targets and thresholds and a sliding scale that 
penalizes low tax efforts with low transfer levels. Put another way, the economic and political 
benefits of contributing to local service provision are obvious to the analyst, but perhaps not 
to the contributor. But if each boliviano he contributes is matched in a proportion of – say – 
5:1 or 10:1 by the center, the likelihood that politicians will try to collect the tax and 
contributors will pay increases greatly. 
The law scores reasonably well on transparency and stability, although once again this 
is difficult to judge based on the legal text alone. The law (and the Constitution) define clear 
tax bases and transfer types for each level of autonomy, which is good. But once again, much 
depends on the fiscal transfer rules left to the discretion of the center and the political 
process. If central transfer rules are not set, or change frequently, or are simply ignored by the 
government, then subnational revenues will be neither stable nor transparent, hindering 
planning and long-term development. Recent experience clearly bears out the benefits of 
transparency and stability. An important component of Bolivia’s success with the 1994 
decentralization can be ascribed to the transparency of the transfer rule it set out – a simple 
per capita amount. This amount, along with local populations (a census had been carried out 
two years earlier), were widely publicized with the advent of Popular Participation through 
radio, newspapers and television, leading to broad grass-roots pressures for investments and 
services in poor communities throughout the country. Furthermore, although the amount was 
gradually increased over time, the per capita criteria did not vary during the crucial early 
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years of reform. A more technically sophisticated and “correct” transfer rule might well have 
impeded this sort of pressure from below, and attenuated decentralization’s success. Where 
the new autonomies are concerned, the best that can be said is that a good precedent for 
transparency and stability exists, but the final outcome is in the hands of the center. 
Political Accountability 
Lastly and most importantly, the decentralization literature7 argues strongly that 
subnational governments that collect local taxes should be politically accountable to the 
citizens who pay them (Treisman 2007). Where such accountability is absent, politicians will 
have strong incentives to over-tax disenfranchised groups in order to provide services for 
those who elect them. The resulting distribution of taxes and benefits is likely to be not only 
inequitable but inefficient. Public goods and services whose costs exceed their benefits will 
nonetheless thrive, as the costs and benefits will be perceived by different people. At the 
limit, this can lead to what 18th century political philosophers called “tyranny” (Madison, 
Hamilton and Jay 1961). By contrast, efficiency obtains when the costs of public goods and 
services are borne by those who benefit from them, as such individuals have no incentive to 
tax themselves to pay for services worth less than their cost. 
For such accountability to occur, the electorate should be sufficiently well informed 
that it can adequately evaluate the performance of subnational governments at election time. 
This implies, first, that the literal meaning of accountability has been exercised, and 
government officials have given account of their activities and decisions in a public forum.8 
Secondly, additional information about subnational government activities is available to the 
media, researchers, firms, NGOs, and the public generally. Thirdly, there is press and media 
                                                 
7 The topic of political accountability is treated in greater depth by the literature on decentralization, more firmly 
grounded in political economy, than that on fiscal federalism, which is more concerned with public finance. 
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freedom between elections, facilitating ongoing accountability via lobbying, demonstrations, 
petitions, personal communications, and any of the myriad other forms by which information 
in transmitted to politicians outside of elections. 
How do we judge the new autonomy regime with regard to these criteria? Although 
incomplete, the evidence available is quite positive. The law itself states clearly that 
The people, by means of civil society, are the principal auditors of the public administration 
carried out by decentralized and autonomous territorial entities. Moreover, society exerts “social 
control” of the quality of public services offered by different territorial entities. (Article 163) 
It specifies the role and importance of participation both in general clauses of the law, and 
also in specific clauses relating to the constitution and administration of autonomous 
municipalities, regions, etc. 
These latter sections build on one of the key innovations of the Popular Participation 
Law of 1994, which incorporated existing civic organizations and traditions of community 
self-government, with all of their attendant legitimacy and power of convocation, into formal 
institutions of municipal government. The Autonomy Law continues in this vein, allowing 
indigenous and rural communities to elect representatives to departmental and regional 
assemblies, and municipal councils, via their own autochthonous practices. Thus whereas the 
LPP opened the door to such representation on the Oversight Committee, the Autonomy Law 
extends it to the main legislative body of subnational governments. It then goes one large step 
further, creating the institutional form of indigenous and rural municipality where methods of 
(s)election and types of legislative body are left open to the discretion of the communities 
that gain such autonomy. 
The new regime thus clearly intends that autonomous government should be 
accountable to the governed, providing the latter with multiple channels for making their 
                                                                                                                                                        
8 This can take a variety of forms, including personal delivery, in written form in any of a variety of media, etc. 
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views known and holding officials to their promises. Does it provide citizens with the 
necessary information to take advantage of these opportunities? The law does not address this 
point directly, but the 2008 Constitution does. The latter guarantees both freedom of 
expression and freedom of the press explicitly (Article 106). Laws and constitutional clauses 
notwithstanding, it is possible for such lofty principles to be comprehensively undermined by 
the practices and preferences of the state. How does Bolivia’s experience with 
decentralization suggest that such lofty principles will be implemented? 
Systemic evidence across 327 Bolivian municipalities suggests widespread press 
freedoms that sustain citizens’ ability to make governments accountable to them when they 
are mobilized and persistent. The evidence from decentralization implies that in the majority 
of Bolivian municipalities, local governments provided public services that were far better 
tailored to local needs than central government had before, implying that citizens used the 
information and political leverage at their disposal to compel politicians to do what they 
wanted. 
It is clear, however, that in certain municipalities accountability was comprehensively 
undermined by unaccountable officials who intentionally limited and distorted information so 
as to perpetuate their hold on power (Faguet 2009). Quantitative evidence suggests that such 
municipalities comprised a minority of the total; qualitative evidence documents that even in 
the worst such case, entrenched abuse of municipal powers and resources by a corrupt 
business-political alliance lasted only a few electoral cycles, and was finally drummed out of 
power by an irate electorate identified in Faguet (Forthcoming). In summary, the evidence 
from decentralization implies that, despite predictable obstructions and local failures, citizens 
were in the main able to inform themselves sufficiently to hold governments to account, and 
so were successful in demanding policies which, in the aggregate, changed national 
investment patterns and made service delivery far more sensitive to objective local needs. 
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7. Conclusions 
This paper has used the theory of fiscal federalism and empirical evidence from 
Bolivia’s radical and much-remarked upon 1994 decentralization reforms as tools for 
assessing that country’s recently enacted autonomy and decentralization reforms. This is 
particularly appropriate given that the logic of the new reform is to extend the municipal 
autonomy created in all but name by the previous reform upwards to the regional and 
departmental levels, and also laterally to indigenous and rural (local) governments. 
Comprehensive evidence from the universe of Bolivian municipalities shows that 
decentralization shifted public investment from infrastructure and economic production into 
primary social services and human capital accumulation. Smaller, poorer rural municipalities 
– largely ignored under the previous centralized regime – gained significant resources, 
producing a more equitable geographic distribution of resources. And decentralization made 
public investment much more responsive to objective local needs than centralized 
government had been before. 
Can the new reform repeat these remarkable successes? The ultimate outcomes of 
reform cannot be predicted from the outset of course. But we can make conditional 
predictions based on the insights of theory and the evidence cited above. If the new regime 
follows the functional assignation across hierarchical levels of government established by the 
LPP, which proves broadly sensible and workable in practice, then we can predict that 
resources will shift further towards primary social services, and make public investment yet 
more responsive to local needs. In terms of taxes and fiscal transfers, the reform appears to 
steer a reasonable course amongst such competing considerations as elasticity of demand, 
factor mobility, distributional impacts, and tax accountability. 
Although the autonomy law is likely to exacerbate vertical imbalances in Bolivia, 
recent experience gives us little reason to fear the threat of bail outs and accompanying 
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macroeconomic instability. But the question of horizontal imbalances is considerably more 
fraught in Bolivia, feeding deep political tensions and strong centrifugal forces at the regional 
level. While nothing in the text of the law implies that horizontal imbalances will improve or 
worsen, recent trends in Bolivia clearly imply the latter. This study strongly recommends 
modifying the allocation of resources across space such that areas of natural resource 
exploitation benefit from the activity they host, but the scale of the benefit is modest. Excess 
funds should then be redirected to poor areas on the basis of objective indicators. 
If the precedents of the past 16 years hold, subnational tax and transfer revenues 
should be adequate to fund most autonomous governments’ obligations. But the same trends 
also predict that the share of own revenues will continue to decline, leaving “autonomous” 
governments dependent on central resources and priorities, and divorcing local policy-
making from the local economy. This study strongly recommends that the national 
government undertake vigorous efforts to reverse these trends by using matching grants to 
incentivize local tax collection. 
While the text of the law implies little about the likely transparency and stability of 
fiscal transfers, the experience of the past 16 years provides reason for optimism. If these 
precedents are respected, then new autonomous governments should similarly reap the 
considerable rewards of transparency and stability in their fiscal receipts. If these precedents 
are not respected, anything is possible – the final outcome is entirely in the hands of the 
center. 
Lastly and most importantly, the regime of autonomies clearly intends that 
autonomous government should be accountable to the governed, providing electoral and non-
electoral channels by which citizens’ views can be known and officials held to account. And 
Bolivia’s experience with decentralization suggests that citizens will in the main be able to 
use these means to press politicians to take the decisions and provide the services they want. 
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In summary, the new autonomies are in many ways an extension of the logic of 
popular participation, deepening the engagement of the people in their own government. If 
theory and recent experience are any guide, their effects are likely to be positive or benign if 
the new regime retains some of the key, tried and tested practices and parameters of the 
previous reform. But as discussed above, in areas like functional allocation and fiscal transfer 
rules, the law (rightly) leaves much discretion in the hands of central policymakers. Much 
thus depends on how the new reforms are managed, and the fairness, transparency and 
competence with which the current administration – which establishes important precedents 
and trends as autonomies are first implemented – comports itself. The good intentions and 
sensible designs of both new and old reforms discussed above could all be undermined by 
distorted or opportunistic administrative practice by the center. Alternatively, an objective 
implementation of the law that respects the sincerity of its intent could unlock the deep 
potential of this reform to improve citizen participation, make government more accountable 
to the governed, and deepen Bolivian democracy. Time, and the government, will tell. 
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